Risque financier systémique | EPFL Graph Search

Dans le domaine de la finance et de la macroéconomie, l'emploi du qualificatif « systémique » dans des expressions comme « risque financier systémique », ou « crise financière systémique », signifie qu'une économie entière est menacée - en tant que système - et non pas seulement des sous-ensembles du systèmes tels que des pays, entreprises collectivités ou ménages ou un seul secteur de l'économie. Un risque financier est dit «systémique» s'il existe une probabilité non négligeable de dysfonctionnement majeur, voire d'effondrement de tout le système financier, sur une vaste zone géographique, voire à échelle planétaire, via des engagements croisés, des effets-dominos, puis des faillites en chaîne, cela peut conduire à un effondrement du système financier mondial. Le risque systémique est en principe au moins partiellement lié à une caractéristique endogène du système considéré. Il s’oppose au risque non-systémique, qui décrit ne concernera qu'un ou quelques éléments du système. C'

Essays in Bank Financing

Yalda Sigrist

This thesis examines the optimal mode of financing for banks and financial institutions. The first chapter, which is a joint work with Prof. Jean-Charles Rochet, investigates how Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs) should be financed. The main specificity of such firms is that their failure imposes negative externalities on the financial system and, more broadly, on the whole economy. Since their shareholders do not internalize these externalities, they tend to provide less capital than what would be socially optimal, generating too many failures. In jurisdictions where they receive tax exemptions, CoCo bonds are a simple means of increasing the resilience of SIFIs while providing large tax benefits to banks' shareholders. However, we show that when tax revenues are properly accounted for, these CoCo bonds are detrimental to social welfare. The second chapter provides a formal model of a bail-in plan, a pre-defined contract that results in self-recapitalization of a financial institution when it is in distress and has no access to equity financing. Bail-ins have the potential to eliminate inefficient bank liquidations and ease financing constraints in bad times. Using a theoretical model of a bail-in contract where banks face time varying financing frictions, taxation and liquidation costs, I show that banks' capital structure decisions and optimal financing and pay-out policies are largely affected by the design of the contingent capital (specifically the conversion ratio). However independent of its design, for an optimal level of debt, bail-in contracts always decrease shareholders incentives to build up liquid buffers and to recapitalize in good times but also eliminate any risk-taking incentives. The third chapter presents a model of bank optimal maturity structure when banks face systemic risk through correlated investments. Banks can privately affect the probability of success of their projects. Risky short-term debt can act as a disciplinary device if it is not rolled over when an adverse interim-date signal on the quality of banks' assets is received. The optimal maturity structure is the result of the trade-off between the disciplinary benefits of short-term debt and the costs of inefficient early liquidations. I show that bank asset commonality affects this trade-off since it reduces the costs of exerting effort through positive information synergies and increases the inefficiency of early liquidations through negative fire-sale externalities. In particular, there is a more important role for the disciplinary effects of short-term debt in high correlation, high fire-sale externalities and low information synergies environments.

EPFL2017

Sentiment, Asset Prices, and Systemic Risk

Giovanni Barone-Adesi, Loriano Mancini

Regulators charged with monitoring systemic risk need to focus on sentiment as well as narrowly defined measures of systemic risk. This chapter describes techniques for jointly monitoring the co-evolution of sentiment and systemic risk. To measure systemic risk, we use Marginal Expected Shortfall. To measure sentiment, we apply a behavioral extension of traditional pricing kernel theory, which we supplement with external proxies. We illustrate the technique by analyzing the dynamics of sentiment before, during, and after the global financial crisis which erupted in September 2008. Using stock and options data for the S&P 500 during the period 2002–2009, our analysis documents the statistical relationship between sentiment and systemic risk.

Cambridge University Press2012

Default And Systemic Risk In Equilibrium

Martin Larsson

We develop a finite horizon continuous time market model, where risk-averse investors maximize utility from terminal wealth by dynamically investing in a risk-free money market account, a stock, and a defaultable bond, whose prices are determined via equilibrium. We analyze the endogenous interaction arising between the stock and the defaultable bond via the interplay between equilibrium behavior of investors, risk preferences and cyclicality properties of the default intensity. We find that the equilibrium price of the stock experiences a jump at default, despite that the default event has no causal impact on the underlying economic fundamentals. We characterize the direction of the jump in terms of a relation between investor preferences and the cyclicality properties of the default intensity. We conduct a similar analysis for the market price of risk and for the investor wealth process, and determine how heterogeneity of preferences affects the exposure to default carried by different investors.

Wiley-Blackwell2015

Essays in Bank Financing

Yalda Sigrist

EPFL2017