Droit de la consommation

Résumé

Le droit de la consommation désigne le droit régissant les relations entre consommateurs et professionnels. Présentation : caractères généraux

Le droit de la consommation appartient à la sphère du droit privé. Il déroge très fortement au droit civil classique du Code civil. Ainsi, selon certains auteurs traditionalistes, sous l'empire du droit de la consommation, la liberté contractuelle n'est pas pleine et entière, car un contractant (le consommateur) peut critiquer une stipulation et obtenir son anéantissement judiciaire (réputé non-écrit) alors qu'il a accepté le contrat en connaissance de cause.
Toutefois, les analyses modernes de l'économie et du droit expliquent, au contraire, ces dérogations par le fait que, dans la relation avec un professionnel, dans le cadre d'un contrat et de conditions générales pré-rédigées et non modifiables, il existe une telle asymétrie dans les informations et les forces en présence que la liberté contractuelle n'est devenue qu'un leu

Source officielle

https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Droit_de_la_consommation

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Essays in Financial Economics

Marc André Frattaroli

This thesis consists of three chapters that study separate subjects in the area of corporate governance and financial intermediation. In the first chapter, I study a protectionist anti-takeover law introduced in 2014 in France that covers a subset of all firms in the economy. The law decreased affected firms' likelihood of becoming the target of a merger or acquisition and had a negative impact on shareholder value. There is no evidence that management of those firms subsequently altered firm policies in its interest. Investment, employment, wages, profitability, and capital structure remain unchanged. The share of annual CEO compensation consisting of equity instruments increased by 8.4 percentage points, suggesting that boards reacted to the loss in monitoring by the takeover market by increasing the pay-for-performance sensitivity. In the second chapter, which is co-authored work with Rüdiger Fahlenbrach, we conduct a detailed analysis of investors in successful initial coin offerings (ICOs). The average ICO has 4,700 contributors. The median participant contributes small amounts and many investors sell their tokens before the underlying product is developed. Large presale investors obtain tokens at a discount and flip part of their allocation shortly after the ICO. ICO contributors lack the protections traditionally afforded to investors in early stage financing. Nevertheless, returns nine months after the ICO are positive on average, driven mostly by an increase in the value of the Ethereum cryptocurrency. In the third chapter, which is joint work with Christoph Herpfer, we investigate how bankers use information from lending relationships to help borrowers combine resources in strategic alliances. Firms that have borrowed from the same banker or share an indirect connection through a network of bankers are significantly more likely to enter an alliance. Consistent with bankers overcoming informational frictions, their ability to facilitate alliances decreases with network distance, and is stronger for opaque borrowers. Firms connected to more potential partners via banker networks enter more alliances. These alliances are associated with positive announcement returns and brokering banks are more likely to receive future underwriting mandates.

EPFL2020

Chargement

This paper studies the effects of fiscal policy on net exports, the terms of trade and expenditure switching. Using data on government spending and consumption taxes for twelve euro area countries over 1996 to 2018, it shows that fiscal austerity shocks improve net exports. This improvement in the trade balance is driven by falling imports while exports do not respond; export and import prices co-move and the terms of trade does not deteriorate in response to an austere shock. The empirical evidence confirms asymmetric expenditure switching, as domestic consumers switch towards domestically produced goods while foreign consumers fail to do so. In a second step, we rationalize these findings in a multi-product small-open DSGE model that features GHH preferences, a non-traded consumption good and pricing to market.

2020

Chargement

Empirical observations suggest that consumers' propensity towards sharing varies with culture and the individuals' socio-demographic characteristics. In an economy with overlapping generations of heterogeneous consumers, we study optimal dynamic selling by a durable-goods monopolist in equilibrium. Feasible dynamic pricing strategies include second-degree price discrimination offering intertemporal consumption bundles in the form of rental and/or purchase options. We find that as the population's peer-trade propensity increases, possibly due to a cultural shift from private ownership to collective consumption, the durable-goods monopolist's optimal strategy shifts from unbundling (offering exclusively rentals), via mixed bundling (offering the options of rental and purchase side-by-side), to pure bundling (offering purchase only). We show that an increase in peer-trade propensity has an ambiguous effect on the firm's profit. Cultural shifts from low to high peer-trade propensity may be delayed by a firm's attempts to artificially disable sharing markets by offering overly low rental rates. However, beyond a certain threshold of peer-trade propensity, the firm prefers a cultural transition to an access-based economy. The underlying reason is that the asset base of a sharing economy ultimately depends on the firm's output, so that a portion of the anticipated rents from sharing can be captured by the durable-goods monopolist.

2019

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Essays in Financial Economics

Marc André Frattaroli

EPFL2020